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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2551

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5358

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE-CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL)

GENEVE FOR USDEL CSCE

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: STATE 218443

1. SUMMARY: COMMENTS BY SEVERAL DELEGATIONS AT NOVEMBER 6
POLADS MEETING ON YUGOSLAV CBM PROPOSAL (TEXT GENEVA 5596) WERE
ALONG EXPECTED LINES AND REVEALED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR GOING
BEYOND TWO GENERALLY APPROVED CBM'S. CANADIAN REP CIRCULATED
PAPER ANALYZING YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL (TEXT BELOW) WHICH WAS
SUPPORTED BY UK REP. INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL WERE RECEIVED AFTER
MEETING AND WILL BE USED AT NOVEMBER 13 MEETING. END SUMMARY.
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2. MILITARY COMMITTEE REP OPENED DISCUSSION BY GIVING PRELIMINARY
COMMENTS, AS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED BY POLADS, ON YUGOSLAV
PAPER. MC REP POINTED OUT THAT YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL WAS DRAFTED
IN GENERALLY VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS TERMS, WHICH HE SAID WAS

UNDESIRABLE IF OBJECT OF EXERCISE WAS TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND BUILD CONFIDENCE. AS TO SUBSTANCE, MC REP SAID YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL WAS GENERALLY PHRASED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GO BEYOND CBMS AND INTO AREA OF MBFR CONSTRAINTS. AS TO POSSIBILITY RAISED BY UK OF USING CONCEPT OF "SELF-RESTRAINT" IN PREAMBLE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON CBM'S MC REP SAID THAT NATO ALREADY PRACTICED SELF-RESTRAINT IN PLANNING ITS MANEUVERS AND SOUGHT TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS. HOWEVER, MC REP SUGGESTED THAT INCLUSION OF CONCEPT OF "SELF-RESTRAINT" WOULD ADD IMPRECISE ELEMENT WHICH COULD BE SOURCE OF FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD WORK AGAINST BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE.

3. CANADIAN REP CIRCULATED PAPER (TEXT BELOW) SUMMARIZING OTTAWA'S VIEWS ON YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL. UK REP SAID LONDON GENERALLY SHARED OTTAWA'S ASSESSMENT ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT THAT YUGOSLAV POSITION ON DEGREE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION ("AT THE LATEST ONE MONTH") WAS IN FACT QUITE CLOSE TO POSITION OF MOST ALLIES. CANADIAN PAPER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL APPEARS TO GO FAR BEYOND THE EXISTING THREE POINT AGENDA OF THE CSCE AND CONTAINS MEASURES WHICH ARE CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLINACE. HOWEVER, THE PROPOSAL DOES CONTAIN SEVERAL POSITIVE ELEMENTS. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH BASIS:

PARAGRAPH 1: THIS PARAGRAPH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT AS IT APPARENTLY ADVOCATES CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY MANOEUVRES BY SETTING LIMITS ON THEIR SCALE AND FREQUENCY. IF ACCEPTED BY THE CONFERENCE IT COULD HAVE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS ON THE ABILITY OF NATO COUNTRIS TO NEGOTIATE PARALLEL MBFR MEASURES. PARAGRAPH 1 ALSO CONTAINS THE TERM: "FRONTIER ZONES" WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE CLOSELY DEFINED AND ALSO STIPULATES THAT THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD

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AVOID HOLDING MANOEUVRES "CLOSE TO" THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OR AIR SPACE OF OTHER STATES. THIS FORMULATION COULD GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES.

PARAGRAPH 2 IS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, THE REFERENCE TO MANOEUVRES DOES NOT SPECIFY "MAJOR". ON THE QUESTION OF THE DEGREE OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, A LONGER PERIOD SEEMS PREFERABLE TO A NOTIFICATION OF 30 DAYS PROVIDED FOR BY THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL. WITH REGARD TO THE ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE SORT OF DETAIL WHICH IS NEEDED TO HELP DISPEL AMBIGUITIES INHERENT IN MANOEUVRES. AN EXAMPLE OF THE DETAIL NEEDED IS FOUND IN THE U.K. PAPER CSCE 1/18 AND IN C-M(73)79(FINAL) WHICH

INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: THE NAME OR THE DESCRIPTION OF THE MANOEUVRE OR MOVEMENT, THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, THE PURPOSE, THE TIME FRAME, THE AREA, THE DEPARTURE AND THE DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPATING UNITS, THE UNIT DESIGNATION AND THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTY STATION.

PARAGRAPH 3: THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL PROTECTS THE ALLIED POSITION BY NOT PROPOSING THAT ONGOING MACHINERY BE CREATED TO ACT AS A CLEARING HOUSE FOR INVITATIONS OR TO INVESTIGATE "VIOLATIONS" OF THE CBM AGREEMENT. IT ALSO SEEMS LOGICAL THAT THE INVITATIONS SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS TO BE INVITED AS WELL AS THE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE MANOEUVRES THEMSELVES INCLUDING INSTRUCTIONS TO OBSERVERS AS TO WHERE TO ASSEMBLE.

PARAGRAPH 4: LIKE PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, THIS PARAGRAPH IMPLIES THAT LIMITS BE SET ON THE SCALE AND SIZE OF MILITARY MANOEUVRES, AND COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE OVERLAP WITH MBFR.

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THE FIRST PART OF PARAGRAPH 5 SEEMS ACCEPTABLE, BUT MAY OF COURSE REQUIRE DEFINITIONS OF "LARGE SCALE" AND "MOVEMENTS". THE SECOND PART OF THE SENTENCE DEALING WITH SMALLER SCALE MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT

SYMPATHETICALLY IN LIGHT OF NORWEGIAN CONSIDERATIONS.
HOW ONE DEFINES MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE "LIABLE TO UNDERMINE
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN STATES" WILL REMAIN LESS THAN CLEAR
UNLESS "SMALL SCALE MOVEMENTS" ARE DEFINED. HOWEVER, IT
MAY BE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST TO LEAVE VAGUE SUCH A
FORMULATION.

IT APPEARS THAT PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF THE YUGOSLAV
PROPOSAL CAN BE RULED AS NON-STARTERS FROM THE ALLIANCE
POINT OF VIEW.

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4. NETHERLANDS REP POINTED OUT THAT PARA THREE OF YUGOSLAV PAPER PROVIDED FOR COUNTRY HOSTING MANEUVER TO ISSUE INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS. HE SAID THIS COULD BE PROBLEM IN CASE OF MANEUVERS WHICH INVOLVED TERRITORY OF MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY AND IN CASE OF NAVAL MANEUVERS. FRENCH REP RECALLED WELL-KNOWN FRENCH POSITION AGAINST GOING BEYOND TWO GENERALLY-APPROVED CBM'S AND SAID PARIS ALSO WISHED AVOID INTRODUCTION OF AMBIGUOUS ELEMENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS. THUS PARIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS PARAS TWO, THREE AND FIVE OF YUGOSLAV PAPER BUT COULD NOT AGREE TO DISCUSS REMAINING PARAS. WITH REFERENCE TO PARA FIVE OF YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL, TURKISH REP REMINDED COMMITTEE OF ANKARA'S POSITION THAT SMALL-SCALE GROUND MOVEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE NOTIFIED BUT THAT SMALL-SCALE AMPHIBIOUS MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. NORWEGIAN REP SAID OSLO UNDERSTOOD TURKISH CONCERNS BUT HE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT PROVISIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR NOTIFICATION OF SMALL-SCALE MOVEMENTS IN CERTAIN AREAS.

5. ITALIAN REP SAID ROME WOULD BE PREPARED DISCUSS PARA TWO, THREE AND FIVE OF YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL, BUT HE RECALLED GENERALLY RESERVED ITALIAN POSITION ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE SAID THAT ROME WAS INTERESTED IN PARA FOUR OF YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL, WHICH HE SAID PROVIDED FOR THE TYPE OF VERY VAGUE UNDERTAKING ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS WHICH ROME COULD ACCEPT IN CSCE CONTEXT.

6. SUBJECT WILL REMAIN ON POLADS AGENDA FOR AT LEAST ONE MORE MEETING, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL USE GUIDANCE REFTEL.

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